Globalization and Contentious Politics: Predicting Women’s and Non-Women’s Protest

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Abstract
What drives individuals to take to the streets in protest? Does the causal logic leading to women’s protest differ from that for non-women’s protest? In this paper, we advance hypotheses on the extent to which the three main aspects of globalization –economic, political, and social–instigate mass protest and show how these effects can be particularly helpful in understanding collective mass mobilization among a historically marginalized group, women. We also draw on various forecasting methods to predict where women’s and non-women’s protests are increasing in the world and assess the strength of our models in forecasting future protest. The results from the data analysis indicates that while economic and political globalization are associated with reduced women’s protest, social globalization is associated with increased women’s protest. We also find that among different aspects of social globalization only personal contacts with those outside of one’s own country increases the likelihood of both women’s and non-women’s protest. The results from the forecasting analysis of women’s and non-women’s mass mobilization indicate that it is more difficult to predict women’s protest than non-women’s protest activities. Overall, our study is the first attempt at forecasting women’s protest and assessing the extent to which our theoretical understanding and ability to forecast women’s protest is similar to our ability to predict non-women’s protest.
Globalization and Contentious Politics: Predicting Women’s and Non-Women’s Protest

On October 17, 2000, an international group called the World March for Women helped to coordinate protests by women throughout the world in order to “put pressure on national and international bodies to advance gender equality” (Inter Press Service (IPS) 2000). According to one news report:

Women from Indonesia’s Moluccan Islands (former Spice Islands) called for an end to sectarian violence in their homeland and Kurdish women for a homeland of their own; French lesbians were demanding anti-discrimination laws be adopted by international bodies; Filipino women called for an end to trafficking of women; Belgian childcare-providers were asking for better working conditions; Arab immigrant women for access to basic social care (IPS 2000).

The movement has continued. In 2015, the group helped to coordinate protests by women in 96 countries around the world during the time period between International Women’s Day, March 8th, and the International Day for the Elimination of Poverty, October 17th. The WMW is not the only gender-focused group organizing political protests. Between 1990 and 2014, over 50,000 women’s protest events throughout the world have been recorded in international news reports. Just recently, on January 21, 2017, the largest protest in United States history concerned women’s rights. Although the protest started with an effort in Washington, DC, “sister” marches were held throughout the country and the world.

Although these events are not as common as general anti-government protests, they often include thousands of people in the street and may even turn violent. For example, anti-rape protests in April 2015 by “women and students” in Guwahati, India involved protestors “damaging a watchtower and bunkers” at a military post and resulted in the use of rubber bullets and batons by police (Mazumdar 2015). Women’s protest may also involve counter-protests, as
happened in Egypt in 2011 when “hundreds of women” who had taken to the streets faced violent “men telling them to ‘go home where they belong’” (AP 2011).

The organization of protests, such as those organized by the World March for Women, are events that would have been much more difficult to coordinate without the increasing ability of individuals to spread information and ideas across borders through social and other forms of globalization. In this paper, we explore whether globalization affects the level of political protest. We specifically advance hypotheses on the extent to which the three main aspects of globalization –economic, political, and social– fuel mass protest and delineate how these effects can be especially instrumental in understanding collective mass mobilization among a historically disadvantaged group, women. Further, drawing on a variety of forecasting methods, we compare our ability to predict both women’s and non-women’s protests. By doing so, we are able to assess whether the current theoretical understanding and ability to forecast women’s protest lags behind our ability to predict non-women’s protest.

We assert that the possible effect of globalization on contentious politics varies by the type of protest activities and, socio-economic and political dimensions of globalization. First, we argue that the marginalized groups are more likely to experience the effects of globalization and thus we expect that globalization has a larger impact on their protest intensity. To test the empirical merits of this argument, we examine how economic, social, and political dimensions of globalization affect collective mobilization by women compared to how globalization affects non-women’s protest.

Second, we argue that the three major aspects of globalization –social, economic, and political– have varying effects on political protest. Social globalization makes it easier to spread
information to attract attention to political causes thus making mobilization more likely, especially among disadvantaged groups. Specifically, in line with Howard-Hassman’s (2005) ideas of globalization as a “second great transformation” and “leapfrogging”, we maintain that groups that historically lagged behind in terms of economic and political rights are more likely to be able to organize in countries socially connected with the rest of the world. Economic globalization can exacerbate socio-economic inequality that might subsequently harm those most vulnerable and limit their ability to be involved in the political process, including their involvement in protest movements. Political globalization can expand institutionalized pathways for disadvantaged groups to air their grievances, limiting the necessity of protest as a means to policy change.

To test the possible impacts of globalization on both women’s and non-women’s protest, we use new and updated data on women’s anti-government protest (Murdie and Peksen 2015) and extend a recent study of general anti-government protest (Bell et al 2013). We define women’s protest as any violent or non-violent events where (a) women or women’s rights groups are among the key organizers and/or (b) gender-specific issues (e.g., women’s rights, rape, and work-place gender discrimination) are the key drivers of the protest (Murdie and Peksen 2015). Non-women’s protest, on the other hand, refers to all other protest events where (a) women or women’s rights groups are not among the key organizers and (b) gender-specific issues are not the key drivers of the protest.

Previous studies tend to focus on either only women’s protest or all protest, and thus fail to investigate whether similar factors drive both types of protest events. The lack of attention to differences across these protest types is surprising given that, though non-women’s protests are more common, collective mobilization among women is ubiquitous across the world. By
disaggregating protests into two categories, women’s and non-women’s protest, we examine the factors that influence protest by a historically disadvantaged group and compare this to other types of protest.

In addition, we evaluate our ability to predict political protest using a set of commonly used forecasting metrics. Beyond simply looking at the covariates of protest, we seek to predict which countries are likely to see increases in protest in the future. The use of forecasting techniques enables us to examine how much the ability to predict protest improves when accounting for the role of globalization. There is growing positivist attention to the role of gender in political science and international relations (Reiter 2015). In line with this attention, the use of forecasting allows us to uncover how much our ability to predict protest activity by women lags behind our understanding of non-women’s protest.

Much research has examined the determinants of anti-government protests, with several studies predicting where anti-government protests and violence are likely to occur in the future (e.g., Gurr and Moore 1997; Brant, Freeman, and Schrodt 2011; Metternich et al 2013). Until recently, there was no cross-national dataset on women’s protest (Murdie and Peksen 2015) and, to the best of our knowledge, no existing attempts to compare it to other types of protest or to forecast women’s protest. Hence, our study is a unique attempt at unveiling whether our theoretical understanding and ability to forecast women’s protest is similar to our ability to predict non-women’s protest.

The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In the following section, we discuss the current knowledge of the correlates of political protest. We then turn to a theoretical discussion of the role that the three different aspects of globalization play across women’s and non-
women’s protest. Next, we describe the research design that we implement to test those hypotheses. We conclude with a discussion of the findings and implications of our study.

**The Relevant Literature: When Protest Occurs**

A large and cross-disciplinary body of scholarship has been devoted to the determinants of political protest (e.g., Gurr 1968; Tilly 1978; Gurr and Moore 1997; Meyer 2004). Much theoretical literature links a state’s repressive or coercive practices to changes in protest behavior. Repression can raise the costs of being involved in a movement (Van Belle 1996). Some of the literature connects these practices to a person’s grievances or feelings of “relative deprivation”, where an individual’s beliefs of what should be provided or guaranteed by their government do not match what they actually receive (Gurr 1968). Repressive state practices can “micro-mobilize” a population to a political cause and delegitimize the state as a responsive actor to public demands (Opp and Ruehl 1990). If certain repressive practices are difficult for the state to deny direct involvement or pass off blame to state agents, it is likely that dissent will increase (Bell et al. 2013). Feelings of relative deprivation, however, can entail much more than just a state’s coercive practices. As Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015, 4) point out, “the argument from this strain of the literature is that perceived injustices or atrocities – often proxied by conditions such as poverty or repression of specific groups – lead to conflict.”

The gender-focused research on contentious politics has also emphasized that relative deprivation, in the form of discriminatory treatment of women, increases the likelihood of mass mobilization among women (Freeman 1975; Costain 1992; Gibson and Lawrence 2010; Curran and Saguy 2013; Murdie and Peksen 2015). Women’s socio-economic and political rights are considered among the key internationally recognized human rights and have been codified into
the international human rights regimes by the UN. While most countries recognize and adopt laws protecting women’s rights, the vast majority fails to strictly enforce them (Cole 2012). The lack of strict enforcement of women’s political rights reduces women’s ability to enjoy such freedoms as the right to join political organizations, to petition government officials, and to establish women’s organizations to promote more respect for women’s rights. Overall, more gendered discrimination diminishes women’s access to education, economic power, and active participation in key economic and political decision-making. This increases the possibility that women will feel more disadvantaged and mistreated relative to either men in the same country or women in other countries.

Another strand of the literature concerns the role of the state in responding to public demands and deterring challenges. A capable state can respond to and deter challenges in ways that do not lead to the same micro-mobilization process described above. Capable states have effective institutions for enforcing laws and maintaining order in society (Fearon and Laitin 2003). As Bell et al. (2013) point out, a capable state may be observed through a sufficiently strong military but may also be observed through a state with an extremely small military, where norms of behavior or outside actors provide capacity to deter challenges. A capable state may also be able to afford devoting a larger portion of their revenues to redistributive policies that mitigate the adverse gendered effects of poverty, lower grievances against the government, improve women’s economic status, and reduce socio-economic inequality (Taydas and Peksen 2012).

Other research on contentious politics suggests that political opportunity structures significantly affect the likelihood of collective mobilization (Tilly 1978; Lichbach 1998). According to this line of research, a favorable political environment is necessary for the emergence
of organized protest. Individuals are more likely to take to the streets when they expect a successful outcome, and if the existing political environment tolerates at least some level of dissent and respects the will of citizens. In the most general sense, the political opportunity view maintains that violent or nonviolent protests are more likely to occur in open political systems.

In her comprehensive work on women and protest in the US, Constan (1992) finds significant evidence in favor of the political opportunity approach. Soule et al.’s work (1999) on women’s protests and activism outside the US, however, shows no significant association between the extent of political openness and collective mobilization among women. Murdie and Peksen (2015) expand on the earlier gender-focused work noting that there is unlikely to be a simple linear association between political openness and women’s protest. In line with earlier work on the correlates of protest (Meyer 2004), they propose a theoretical model establishing that women’s protest is more likely in countries with “mixed” political regimes. They specifically assert that women are less likely to mobilize in closed, mostly authoritarian regimes because of the expectation that they will not achieve their goals taking to the street and the government will not be tolerant of gendered dissent. More political openness would create a favorable political environment and optimism among women to publicly express and achieve their demands using protest.

Yet, after a certain level of openness, organized dissent might be a less attractive strategy since women’s groups might be more inclined to use less costly and effective tactics –such as contacting their representatives directly or participating in a letter writing campaign– available in liberal democratic systems. Hence, Murdie and Peksen (2015) point to a possible ceiling effect suggesting that “after a certain level, an open political system may not be associated with
increased protests because individuals have alternative insider tactics to use to influence political outcomes” (184).

Another strand of literature highlights the role of potential dissident resources in driving protest (Gurr 1968). When individuals and groups find it easier to organize and coordinate their dissent, increases in protest are likely. Conversely, when restrictions are imposed on freedom of association and assembly rights, this might hinder the ability of dissidents to organize collective action (Soule et al. 1999; Bell et al 2013). Freedom of association allows men and women to form organizations advocating for their causes and allows them to assume an active role in existing organizations. It also helps individuals better communicate their grievances and frustrations with one another. Therefore, dissidents’ ability to communicate with each other and their ability to be involved in organizations advocating for their causes might decrease the cost of collective action and hence instigate more mass mobilization and protest. Murdie and Peksen (2015) found, for example, that the existence of women’s organizations aided non-violent protest.

Globalization and Contentious Politics

Beyond these established drivers of protest we discussed in the preceding section, the conflict literature has produced a wealth of expectations and findings about the relationship between globalization, defined quite broadly as interconnections among countries, and conflict. Although much of the political science literature focuses almost exclusively on civil wars (Schneider, Barbieri, and Gleditsch 2003; Barbieri and Reuveny 2005), we incorporate insights from this literature into our existing framework for understanding domestic anti-state protest. Further, we incorporate insights from sociology, where there has been much more focus on
certain aspects of globalization and their linkages to contentious politics in general (e.g., Smith 2001; Della Porta 2006; Dodson 2015).

We follow Dreher (2006) and Dreher, Gaston, and Martens (2008) and separate globalization out into three components: economic, political, and social. Economic globalization refers to the extent of interconnection between countries through higher volumes of trade and investment. Political globalization is “characterized by a diffusion of government policies” (Dreher 2006, 1092) and is often thought of as the political integration of a country into the larger international system. Social globalization refers to the extent of the transnational spread of ideas and information. In the following sections, we discuss the possible effect that each of the three aspects of globalization has on anti-government protest. We also explain why globalization might have a greater impact on collective mobilization among women as a historically disadvantaged group, than non-women’s protest.

Economic Globalization and Contentious Politics

Much of the literature on civil conflict is reflective of Immanuel Kant’s central thesis concerning trade as a conduit for peace (Schneider, Barbieri, and Gleditsch 2003; Barbieri and Reuveny 2005). Economic globalization might help increase political rights for previously disadvantaged groups, expanding the non-violent or institutional tools political dissidents have through which to make their demands without organized protest and, perhaps, limiting some of a population’s grievances that cannot be easily accommodated. Economic globalization has been found, for example, to be positively associated with respect for physical integrity rights and more specifically women’s rights (Richards and Gelleny 2007; de Soysa and Vadlamannati 2011).

In addition to economic globalization reducing grievances and incentives to protest, it might also reduce the ability to coordinate and mobilize. As Dodson (2015) points out, economic
globalization is often accompanied with a reduction in trade unions, which could have served as a means of coordination and mobilization. Economic globalization can also exacerbate economic inequality, especially in highly developed countries (Dreher and Gaston 2008). This could further affect the means of coordination of those harmed by greater inequality, such as historically disadvantaged groups.

All of this extant literature thus suggests a negative relationship between economic globalization and anti-government protest. Global economic integration might reduce the extent of state repression and grievances, but also exacerbate inequality that might subsequently reduce the mobilization tools that aid in protest. We expect these effects to be particularly acute when focusing on women’s protest. Economic globalization is associated with higher levels of respect for women’s rights (Richards and Gelleny 2007; Cho 2013). Further, as Howard-Hassmann (2005) contends, economic globalization might increase competition for resources among different groups in society, especially to the extent as globalization heightens inequality more generally (29). Consequently, economic globalization might lessen the available time and resources that women and women’s rights groups have at their disposal for the organization and mobilization that protest entails.

Based on the above discussion, we hypothesize that:

Hypothesis 1: Economic globalization is associated with decreases in the extent of political protest, especially in the level of women’s political protest.

Political Globalization and Contentious Politics

Political globalization could decrease the likelihood of protest by providing alternative political tools through which citizens can voice their dissent and by reducing grievances. Earlier research finds that political globalization is also associated with lower levels of state repression
De Soysa and Vadlamannati 2011; Dreher, Gassebner, and Siemers 2012), including women’s rights violations (Cho 2013).

Dodson (2015) finds that political globalization increases forms of political dissent that may be less visible, such as signing petitions. As political globalization increases the opportunities for citizens to make their voices heard through institutionalized means, it is likely that overall levels of protest could decrease as citizens use alternative means of expression. Further, as countries become politically integrated into the international system, they might be more inclined to accept the demands of its citizenry (Greenhill 2008).

Similar to economic globalization, these effects are likely to be more pronounced when focusing on women’s protest. As a historically disadvantaged group that has been left out of traditional institutional pathways of voicing dissent, political globalization would be especially important in providing alternatives to organized protest, such as directly petitioning political leaders or working through procedures outlined in domestic and international law.

Based on this discussion, we hypothesize that:

*Hypothesis 2: Political globalization is associated with decreases in the extent of political protest, especially in the level of women’s political protest.*

Social Globalization and Contentious Politics

Of all of the components of globalization, social globalization appears to most robustly map on to the idea of citizen mobilization and the tools through which citizens can organize against their state. We expect that social globalization will both increase the knowledge of global human rights, making it more likely that individuals recognize their own human rights being violated, while also making it easier to mobilize global campaigns against human rights abuses. Through connections to others with similar goals and problems across the globe, citizens can
draw on additional resources through which to organize and coordinate. Although some of these connections may encourage institutionalized or more non-violent forms of dissent, on the whole, these connections will allow sections of the population to rise up with increased coordination.

Social globalization might allow international activists to help coordination and organization about particular causes (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Bob 2005; Murdie and Bhasin 2011).

Social globalization expands a population’s ability to be aware of better human rights conditions outside of one’s own state. It might therefore lead to an increase in grievances as individuals become more aware of the rights that others in the world readily enjoy. These expectations are consistent with Howard-Hassman’s (2005) conception of globalization as the “second great transformation.” The implication of her argument for the effects of globalization on human rights is that we should expect a “leapfrogging of human rights across time and space” (4). She argues that, at least in the long-run, human rights norms will more easily diffuse across borders as a result of globalization. She refers in particular to the fact that “globalization has spread the idea of human rights world wide” and that “it has speeded up social change (39).” This ease in the spread information that is part of social globalization potentially has an intermediate step before it actually leads to improved human rights. As a result of increasing the recognition among disadvantaged populations of their human rights, social globalization will likely lead to greater grievances against the government, thus making countries that are connected through social globalization likely to experience higher volumes of protest. This leapfrogging is likely to play a role among specific groups that have a long history of discrimination and human rights abuses, such as women.
The extant literature on women’s mobilization has also highlighted how social globalization facilitates collective mobilization among women. In “Globalization: The Secret Weapon for Feminists,” Neuwirth (2003) remarks that, “for the Women’s Movement, globalization has brought to life a previously unimaginable capacity to organize across continents and mobilized international solidarity on a moment’s notice” (3). Hence, by increasing organizational recourses and coordination, we expect that:

_Hypothesis 3: Social globalization is associated with increases in the level of both women’s and non-women's political protest._

Social globalization, as it is defined and measured in the extant literature, is composed of three distinct parts: personal contact with individuals outside of the state, information flows that spread ideas between individuals, and cultural proximity to Western cultural products (Dreher, Gaston, and Martens 2008). Of the three components, we expect that the strongest causal link is between personal contact and political protest. This is because personal contact allows dissidents to draw on the broader network of concerned activists and the organizational resources these activists can bring. We also expect a strong causal link between information flows and protest, especially the role that access to the internet has in coordinating and mobilizing political protest. Finally, it is unlikely that there is a strong link between cultural proximity and increases in political protest. The common measure for cultural proximity, the KOF Index of Globalization, measures cultural proximity based on the number of McDonald’s restaurants, Ikea’s, and trade in books. Hence, it is unlikely that this aspect of social globalization provides the same resources for protest mobilization as information flows and personal contact.

**Research Design**

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In order to test the above hypotheses and to construct forecasting models of both women’s protest and non-women’s protest, we estimate two sets of models. For both sets of models, the unit of analysis is the country-year from 1990 to 2014.

**Outcome Variables**

To capture political protest, we generate measures of protest events using the Integrated Data for Event Analysis (IDEA) framework (Bond et al. 2003). For updated data through 2014, we contracted Virtual Research Associates (VRA) to produce the data from Reuters Global News Service reports. Relying on Reuters reports provides broader coverage than datasets that rely on the *New York Times* or other single-source event datasets and yet does not suffer from some of the pathologies associated with multiple-source event datasets (Schrodt 2015). The specific set of protest events identified in this dataset originates from Bhasin (2008), but are updated in Murdie and Bhasin (2011). Bell et al. (2013) also utilize these data in a previous effort to forecast political protest, but more specifically, only violent protest.

Each event identifies “who” did “what” to “whom”. This allows us to isolate events where individuals or groups in the population target the government with protest. Rather than separating out violent and non-violent protest events, we are interested here in separating out protest events that clearly involve women and/or women-specific causes from those that do not.\(^1\) We update data used in Murdie and Peksen (2015), where, using the IDEA framework, they identify events where the actor or actors involved in the protest are identified as “woman”, “women”, or “feminist” in the “body or header of the event and a protest event is cited in this

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\(^1\) While it is beyond the scope of this study, future research could focus on whether the same arguments apply for both violent and nonviolent protest.
same body or header” (Murdie and Peksen 2015, 6). For a measure of non-women’s protest, we focus on all other protest events where women and/or gender-specific causes are not identified.

Similar to the dependent variables generated in Bell et al. (2013), both the women’s protest variable and the non-women’s protest variable are weighted based on Goldstein (1992) scores. This is reversed so a higher score indicates a more violent or severe protest event. After weighting the events, the events for each country are summed within each country-year, leaving us with a weighted sum of protest activity for each country-year between 1990 and 2014.

Figure 1 provides a representation of the average yearly protest activity in a country over time. The average country has far more non-women’s protest than women’s protest in a given year. This is not surprising giving the non-women’s protests data include several different forms of protest events. In our sample, 3% of country-years have greater intensity in a year for women’s protest than non-women’s protest. Our measures for women’s protest and non-women’s protest are correlated at 0.54. We do include the other form of protest as a control variable in all models; in other words, models where the dependent variable is women’s protest include non-women’s protest as a control and models where the dependent variable is non-women’s protest include women’s protest as a control. We do this because of the many examples of women holding their own marches for causes that have also been subject to non-women’s protest, as occurred in Tunisia during the Arab Spring. In other words, women’s protest and non-women’s protest could affect each other.

These observations include countries with a high degree of variance in their media coverage in Reuters, in their regime type, and in their treatment of women. For example, included in the observations of countries with a higher intensity of women’s protest to non-women’s protest in a given year are Iran in 2002, Kenya in 2005, the Netherlands in 1998, and Cambodia in 2001. This provides us some reassurance that any differences in reported protests between women and non-women are not due to some sort of bias in coverage of women’s protest to highly developed countries.

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Explanatory Variables

To test the hypotheses presented above, we use measures from the KOF Index of Globalization (Dreher 2006; Dreher, Gaston, Martens 2008). Economic globalization is an index made up of actual economic flows (trade, FDI, and portfolio investment) and restrictions on economic flows (tariff barriers and hidden import barriers). The social globalization variable is an index that consists of measures from three conceptual groups: personal contacts, information flows, and cultural proximity. Personal contacts are captured with international telecom traffic, the number of international letters sent and received, tourism traffic, and government and worker transfers. Information flows are captured with measures of the amount of internet, television, and international newspaper presence within a state. Cultural proximity is quantified using the measures of imported and exported books, Ikea stores, and the number of McDonald’s restaurants located in a country. Finally, the political globalization index is generated with measures of how many embassies and high commissions are within a country and the number of IGOs a country is member to. The index variables are all on a scale from 1 to 100, with greater scores indicating more globalization.³

We run three models for each dependent variable: (a) a model with the indices for economic, social, and political globalization included, (b) a model without the indices for globalization, and (c) a model with the indices for economic and political globalization and the

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³ Although these measures are correlated (varying from .36 to .81 in the sample), their correlation is not high enough to warrant concern with multicollinearity in our models. When we exclude the squared term for armed forces from the model, all mean variance inflation factors of the models in the paper are below 3 and no individual VIF is above 6 (O’Brien 2007). A correlation matrix of all variables in the models can be found in our online appendix.
sub-indices for social globalization (personal contact, information flows, cultural proximity) included.

We also include a battery of control variables to account for the major covariates of political protest as identified by the contentious politics literature discussed above. We include the same control variables in all models to be able to compare the main findings across specifications. To account for state capacity, we include variables that capture *relative political reach*, *relative political extraction*, and a quadratic specification of hundreds of thousands of *military personnel*. The measures for relative political reach and relative political extraction both come from Kugler and Tammen (2012). Relative political reach captures a government’s ability to mobilize its citizenry; we use the version of this variable that uses adjusted OECD data. Relative political extraction captures the ability of the country to use appropriations for public goods. Our measure of military personnel is drawn from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2014). We include the squared term to account for the possible nonlinear effect of the military personnel variable on political protest, consistent with Bell et al (2013).

Using the Cingranelli and Richards Human Rights Data (CIRI) (Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay 2014), we control for a variety of indicators capturing both human rights violations in general and women’s rights violations. We include *extrajudicial killings*, *disappearance*, *political imprisonment*, and *torture* to account for the level of respect for physical integrity rights. Each of these measures is coded on a 3-point scale (0-2) with higher values indicating greater respect for that right (i.e., lower repression). We also include the *women’s economic rights* and *women’s political rights* variables. They are both coded on a 4-point scale (0-3) with higher values indicating greater respect for women’s rights. As the CIRI data are only gathered
through 2011, we impute values of these variables from 2011 for the years 2012 and 2013. We use CIRI’s *assembly and association* to capture the extent to which citizens in a country are able to freely coordinate organized activities such as anti-government protests and demonstrations. The variable is also coded on a 0 to 2 scale with higher values indicating greater respect for the right to assemble.

Finally, we control for a set of standard control variables that are included in models of political protest. We include the natural log of *population* (World Bank 2014). We also control for regime type by including the -10 (autocratic) to +10 (democracy) indicator for regime type and its square term drawn from the Polity IV data. This operationalization allows us to capture the possibility that mixed or anocratic regimes are more susceptible to protest from the population (Marshall et al. 2010; Murdie and Peksen 2015). Additionally, we include a control for whether there was a civil conflict in the state in the past five years. We include this variable because of the changes that could take place in gender roles after civil war (Goldstein 2003; ). The indicator is based on codings of civil wars (1000 or more battle deaths) from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015).

We also include a variable that accounts for the number of core human rights conventions and optional protocols ratified by a country. The data are gathered from the UCL’s National Commitment to Human Rights database and from various UN websites for the post-2009

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4 As all the independent variables are lagged, we only need values through 2013. The final year of the dependent variable is observed in 2014.

5 The UCL dataset is available at: http://www.ucl.ac.uk/spp/research/research-projects/nchr. The following twelve human rights conventions and their optional protocols are included in the variable: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the International Covenant on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the Convention on the Rights of the Child; the International Convention on the
period. In line with our overall argument regarding political globalization, we expect that these treaties would provide an additional type of institutional recourse for dissidents that may reduce their likelihood to protest. Worth mentioning, however, the majority of human rights treaties do not focus specifically on women’s rights, which may therefore lead to a stronger link between human rights treaties and non-women’s protest.

Given that we use event data for our dependent variables, it is necessary that we control for potential bias in media coverage. There are two ways that we account for this possible bias. First, we include a dichotomous indicator of whether the country is a member of the OECD. Our expectation is that these countries would receive more media coverage in Reuters. Second, in the online appendix, we run models where we include additional controls for overall media coverage in Reuters and for freedom of speech and the press from the CIRI dataset. Our key results are substantively and statistically similar with these controls.

Given the continuous nature of the dependent variable, we run an ordinary least squares model with robust standard errors. All the independent variables are lagged one year except for the alternative type of political protest variables, which is measured in the same year as the dependent variable. We use multiple imputation methods, discussed in the online appendix, to include as complete a sample as possible. Importantly, we do not impute our globalization

Protection of Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families; and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

6 Results as to our key hypotheses are substantively similar when we run models with random effects.

7 We ran tests for autocorrelation from Wooldridge (2002) and Drukker (2003). We do not reject the null of no autocorrelation with the non-women’s protest models. This indicates that autocorrelation is not likely to be an issue in our analysis. We did, however, reject the null of no autocorrelation in the women’s protest models. When the US and the UK were taken out of the sample for the women’s protest models, we were then able to not reject the null of no autocorrelation. Importantly, results as to our globalization hypotheses are the same as to sign and statistical significance. These results can be found in our online appendix.
measures; when these measures are included our sample size goes down from 3,340 observations to 3,215 observations.

Findings and Discussion

Table 1 provides the results from both the women’s and non-women’s protest models. For each dependent variable, we first provide model results with the inclusion of the globalization variables (Model 1 and 4) and then provide a model without their inclusion for comparison (Models 2 and 5). We finally provide a model with the components for social globalization used instead of the social globalization index (Models 3 and 6).

Our results generally support our expectations regarding the various ways in which aspects of globalization influence political dissent. We only find statistically significant relationships between globalization and women’s protest; when women’s protest is separated out from non-women’s protest, any relationship between non-women’s protest and the various indices for globalization goes away. We take this to imply that the influences of globalization are most prevalent for historically disadvantaged groups such as women.

Our results indicate that economic globalization is associated with diminished women’s political protest intensity. We thus find support for Hypothesis 1 with regards to women’s protest only. As to Hypothesis 2, we also find support for the role of political globalization in diminishing protest by historically disadvantaged groups. As reported in Models 4 and 6, the coefficient for the political globalization variable is negative in the women’s protest model and statistically significant. We do not find the same effect when focusing on non-women’s protest, as shown in Models 1 and 2.
Our findings also suggest that social globalization is significantly associated with increases in women’s protest intensity. This supports Hypothesis 3 and our argument concerning how social globalization can bring individuals, ideas, and resources to a cause that might help collective mobilization. As shown for non-women’s protest in Model 3 and for women’s protest in Model 6, disaggregating the components of social globalization provides us with more support for the general idea that it is personal contact and information, as opposed to cultural proximity, that drives the relationship between social globalization and political protest. As reported in Model 3, personal contact is associated with an increase in non-women’s protest. Additionally, we find in Model 6 that both personal contact and information flows are associated with increases in women’s protest.

Among the control variables included in the models, the other type of protest variable is statistically significant indicating that both women’s and non-women’s protest increase the likelihood of one another. Both types of protest are associated in a non-linear manner with military personnel. That is, political dissent appears to be more likely in countries either with relatively strong or weak military capabilities. Given the paucity of studies that separate out women’s and non-women’s protest, we find some interesting differences in the sign and statistical significance of some of the other control variables in the models. For example, relative political extraction is only statistically significant in the women’s protest models with a positive coefficient sign indicating that public goods allocations are associated with an increase in women’s protest.

The ratification of human rights treaties is only statistically significant in the non-women’s protest models. This suggests that human rights treaties may provide alternative channels for voicing dissent against a government but that these channels may be more important
for non-women’s protesters. We also find differences in the sign and significance of the CIRI human rights variables for the non-women’s protest and women’s protest models. Interestingly, women’s protest does not appear to be “micro-mobilized” by acts of repression. Instead, more intense women’s protest occurs when human rights are generally improved.

Predictions of Future Protest

Given these findings, where should we expect more intense protest in the future? We first use a simple risk assessment method developed by Gurr and Moore (1997) to offer both in- and out-of-sample predictions on where protests are likely to increase in the next five years. We then use accuracy, recall, and precision metrics to evaluate the quality of the predictions (O’Brien 2002). Second, we look to two common forecast assessment tools, RMSE and CRPS, to evaluate the yearly out-of sample predictions from the estimated models (Brandt, Freeman, and Schrodt 2011; Metternich et al 2013). These tools allow us to make some predictions about future protest, while also providing us an opportunity to compare our ability to predict women’s and non-women’s protest.

The process for the risk assessment method used here is as follows. First, for each of the models in Table 1, we generate the residuals. We focus on observations where there are negative residuals, because these are the cases where there is lower protest than predicted, and the model can be thought of as suggesting that there is pent up demand for protest, and as a result, a greater likelihood of protest in the future. Next, for all cases where there are negative residuals in year t, we look at whether there are increases in protest intensity in the next five observations. This is similar to practices outlined in Gurr and Moore (1997) and O’Brien (2002, 2010).
We evaluate our predictions based on metrics of accuracy, recall, and precision. As O’Brien (2010, 91) indicates, these metrics are calculated as:

Accuracy: \( \frac{\text{number of correct predictions}}{\text{number of predictions made}} \)

Recall: \( \frac{\text{number of correctly predicted increases}}{\text{number of increases occurred}} \)

Precision: \( \frac{\text{number of correctly predicted increases}}{\text{number of increases predicted to occur}} \)

According to O’Brien (2010), ideally, accuracy and recall should be above 80% and precision should be above 70%; in reality, however, these metrics in O’Brien (2010) concerning domestic crises, as a similar low-scale political violence outcome to protest, are sometimes well-below 50% in existing predictive projects.

Table 2 provides the summary model performance for the 1990-2014 sample. For general anti-government protest, our predictions are similar to both Bell et al (2013) and to the domestic crises projects outlined in O’Brien (2010). For women’s protest, however, our performance is not as strong: although our recall is very high (above 70%), our accuracy and precision are less than 30%. This suggests that more research is needed to understand and predict women’s protest. The women’s protest models make a large number of false positive predictions, cases where the models suggest there should be increases in protest but there is not an increase observed.

Table 3 provides the same statistics for out-of-sample predictions. For this, we run models for the time period 1990 to 2009. We then calculate residuals and focus on states that have negative residuals in the year 2009. Based on these cases, we then examine whether there was an increase in anti-government protest from 2010-2014. These O’Brien (2010) metrics are similar to our in-sample metrics but reinforce the difficulties in predicting protest by women.
Table 4 includes the top ten most “at-risk” states for increases in anti-government protest from 2015-2020, based on the size of the negative residuals in these states in 2014 for each of our models. These predictions appear to have a lot of face validity. Although there are many states that appear on both lists (China, Russia, Iran, and Burma), there are some key countries with pent-up demand for either non-women’s anti-government protest or women’s protest but not both. For example, Mexico and Israel are predicted to have increases in non-women’s protest but not women’s protest. Conversely, the United States, Yemen, Egypt, and France are predicted to have increases in women’s protest but not non-women’s protest. The prediction regarding the United States is especially interesting given the January 21st women’s rights protests throughout the country.

Figures 2 and 3 map out where there is a higher risk of increased protest in the future, with darker shades indicating a higher risk of future protest. Figure 2 shows the risk of non-women’s protest and Figure 3 shows the risk of women’s protest. The most interesting difference between these two maps comes in the predictions for Africa. There is certainly variation in the risk of increased protest across African states in non-women’s protest. However, what stands out in comparison is that the risk of increased women’s protest is uniformly low in African states. This difference might be in part because of the lower levels of social globalization observed in Africa compared to the other parts of the world.

Out of Sample Prediction Assessment with RMSE and CRPS

We also generate a set of out-of-sample predictions to compare the models estimated above using Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) and Continuous Rank Probability Score (CRPS) metrics across time. Following the approach taken in Metternich et al. (2013), the out of sample
predictions for generating these metrics are produced as follows. We start by re-estimating the models estimated above for all the years in the sample except for the final 9 years (first sample includes 1990 to 2005). We then break out those 9 excluded years into three different periods. The first period includes 2006 to 2008, the second period includes 2009 to 2011, and the third period includes 2012 to 2014. To generate the out of sample predictions for the years 2006 to 2008, we estimate the model including the years up to 2005 and generate predictions for the following three years based on those estimates. To generate predictions for 2009 to 2011, we add the observations from 2006 to 2008 to the estimation sample, and then use those results for the out of sample predictions. We then add the years 2009 to 2011 to our sample and generate the out of sample predictions for the years 2012 to 2014.

Using these predictions, we generate the RMSE and CRPS to compare the predictions generated from the globalization models to those generated from the models that do not account for globalization, and to compare the CRPS for the women’s and non-women’s protest. The RMSE provides an indication of how much the out-of-sample prediction misses the actual observed value. A lower value on these metrics indicates that the predictions are closer to the observed values. The CRPS, also based on a comparison of the observed and predicted values, makes a comparison of these values based on where they fall on their respective cumulative distributions. Lower values on this metric are also preferred when comparing the calibration of the forecasting models. As we are estimating our models in a cross-sectional time series sample, and because we do not have the space to present the RMSE and CRPS for every observation, we

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8 The RMSE is in the metric of the dependent variable, so is therefore not comparable across dependent variables. However, the CRPS is in the same metric, thus making it possible to compare the women’s to non-women’s protest models.
present the mean RMSE and CRPS across countries for each year in the sample. These metrics are plotted in Figures 4 and 5.

The comparison between the globalization and non-globalization models does not reveal a consistent pattern. Figure 4 plots the RMSE and CRPS for the non-women’s forecasting model. In most of the years the RMSE is higher in the globalization model than in the non-globalization model. Interestingly, when evaluated with CRPS, the globalization model has a similar or a lower mean score in six out of the nine years. Figure 5 plots the RMSE and CRPS across years for the women’s protest forecasts. Strangely, the RMSE is lower for the forecasts from the non-globalization model across all years. However, the difference between them is very small. More in line with what we would expect, the CRPS values from the globalization model are equal to or lower than the CRPS from the non-globalization model in six out of nine years.

Overall, the above metrics suggest that the inclusion of globalization measures does not consistently increase the ability to forecast. However, the CRPS do consistently show that our ability to forecast non-women’s protest is much greater than women’s protest. The mean CRPS in the women’s protest forecasts (ranging from .26 to .31) is higher than the mean CRPS in the non-women’s protest forecasts (ranging from .09 to .19) in every year. Similar to the results of the accuracy, recall, and precision metrics reported above, this suggests a greater ability to forecast non-women’s protest than women’s protest, given our existing understanding of these two outcomes.

Conclusion

We have explored the extent to which the three main aspects of globalization –economic, political, and social – increase the likelihood of women and non-women’s protest. Our results
suggest that while economic and political globalization are associated with reduced women’s protest, social globalization, as indicative of increased information and organizational resources, is associated with increased women’s protest. When we analyze different components of social globalization, we find that personal contacts with those outside of one’s own country increases the likelihood of both women’s and non-women’s protest.

Extant literature on contentious politics tends to focus either on all protest activities or just women’s protest, and thus does not explore whether similar factors instigate both types of protest events. By separating women’s protest from protest activities where women or women’s groups are not active, our study offers a unique analysis of the factors associated with protest by women, a historically disadvantaged group, and compare this to other types of protest.

Using updates to two recently gathered unique cross-national datasets on general and women’s protest events, we have also provided a forecasting analysis of where women’s and non-women’s mass mobilization are likely to increase across the world. Our data analysis indicates that similar socio-economic and political factors drive women’s and non-women’s collective mobilization. Yet our predictions for non-women’s protest and women’s protest indicate that it is more difficult to predict women’s protest than non-women’s protest activities.

Our study is the first attempt at forecasting women’s protest. Future studies could extend this work and further examine the possible factors and methods that help us improve our ability to forecast women’s protest. Future work that explains when, where, and why women’s protest is likely to occur is important both to our understanding of political behavior by women and to our overall understanding of conflict processes. Another future research avenue could be to investigate whether both violent and non-violent forms of protest are driven by similar factors.
Such analyses would further enhance the current understanding of what countries are more vulnerable to violent or non-violent dissent.
Figure 1: Average Women’s Protest and Non-Women’s Protest per Country-Year over Time
Table 1: Correlates of Non-Women’s and Women’s Political Protest

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>(1) Non Women’s Protest</th>
<th>(2) Non Women’s Protest</th>
<th>(3) Non Women’s Protest</th>
<th>(4) Women’s Protest</th>
<th>(5) Women’s Protest</th>
<th>(6) Women’s Protest</th>
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<tr>
<td>Other Type of Protest</td>
<td>1.684**</td>
<td>1.692**</td>
<td>1.665**</td>
<td>0.126**</td>
<td>0.125**</td>
<td>0.125**</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.225)</td>
<td>(0.220)</td>
<td>(0.226)</td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
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<td>1.573</td>
<td>2.043</td>
<td>2.702**</td>
<td>2.812**</td>
<td>3.166**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.377)</td>
<td>(3.267)</td>
<td>(3.408)</td>
<td>(0.810)</td>
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<td>(0.798)</td>
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<td>Relative Political Extraction</td>
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<td>(0.901)</td>
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<td>Economic Globalization</td>
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<td>-0.034**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
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<td>Social Globalization</td>
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<td>0.039</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
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<td>Personal Contact</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
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<td>Information Flows</td>
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<td>Cultural Proximity</td>
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<td>Political Globalization</td>
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<td>-0.020*</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.032)</td>
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<td>Population (ln)</td>
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<td>0.848</td>
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<td>-0.280#</td>
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<td>(0.580)</td>
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<td>(0.604)</td>
<td>(0.170)</td>
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<td>Military Personnel</td>
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<td>4.140**</td>
<td>4.343**</td>
<td>0.456*</td>
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<td>(0.629)</td>
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<td>Military Personnel Squared</td>
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<td>-0.098**</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
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<td>(0.005)</td>
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<td>Human Rights Treaties</td>
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<td>-0.720**</td>
<td>-0.543**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.153)</td>
<td>(0.136)</td>
<td>(0.161)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
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<td>CIRI Women’s Economic Rights</td>
<td>-0.630</td>
<td>-0.362</td>
<td>-0.878</td>
<td>0.165</td>
<td>0.200</td>
<td>0.136</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.689)</td>
<td>(0.685)</td>
<td>(0.684)</td>
<td>(0.179)</td>
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<td>CIRI Women’s Political Rights</td>
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<td>0.406</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.779)</td>
<td>(0.783)</td>
<td>(0.793)</td>
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<td>CIRI Political Disappearances</td>
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<td>-1.943#</td>
<td>-1.439</td>
<td>0.479#</td>
<td>0.486*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.090)</td>
<td>(1.022)</td>
<td>(1.088)</td>
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<td>CIRI Political Killing</td>
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<td>-1.502#</td>
<td>-1.334</td>
<td>-0.205</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.856)</td>
<td>(0.807)</td>
<td>(0.851)</td>
<td>(0.226)</td>
<td>(0.216)</td>
<td>(0.226)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIRI Political Prisoners</td>
<td>-2.523**</td>
<td>-2.633**</td>
<td>-2.551**</td>
<td>0.453*</td>
<td>0.488*</td>
<td>0.454*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.805)</td>
<td>(0.797)</td>
<td>(0.801)</td>
<td>(0.222)</td>
<td>(0.220)</td>
<td>(0.223)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIRI Torture</td>
<td>-1.049</td>
<td>-1.042</td>
<td>-1.571*</td>
<td>-0.251</td>
<td>-0.220</td>
<td>-0.286</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.684)</td>
<td>(0.683)</td>
<td>(0.701)</td>
<td>(0.186)</td>
<td>(0.182)</td>
<td>(0.192)</td>
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<td>CIRI Association</td>
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<td>2.087*</td>
<td>2.086*</td>
<td>-0.545*</td>
<td>-0.512*</td>
<td>-0.511*</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.857)</td>
<td>(0.817)</td>
<td>(0.858)</td>
<td>(0.258)</td>
<td>(0.243)</td>
<td>(0.259)</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(1.859)</td>
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<td>(0.501)</td>
<td>(0.545)</td>
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<td>Post War</td>
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<td>0.563</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(2.514)</td>
<td>(2.389)</td>
<td>(2.514)</td>
<td>(0.805)</td>
<td>(0.750)</td>
<td>(0.807)</td>
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<td>Constant</td>
<td>11.931</td>
<td>13.106</td>
<td>-7.219</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.586</td>
<td>-4.787</td>
</tr>
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Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, # p<0.10
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model Description</th>
<th>Accuracy</th>
<th>Recall</th>
<th>Precision</th>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Women’s Protest, Globalization Model (Model 1)</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Women’s Protest, Without Globalization Variables (Model 2)</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.52</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Women’s Protest, Globalization Components Model (Model 3)</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.53</td>
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<tr>
<td>Women’s Protest, Globalization Model (Model 4)</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.29</td>
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<tr>
<td>Women’s Protest, Without Globalization Variables (Model 5)</td>
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<td>.74</td>
<td>.29</td>
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<td>Women’s Protest, Globalization Components Model (Model 6)</td>
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<td>.74</td>
<td>.28</td>
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Table 3: Summary Model Performance Metric (O’Brien 2002, 2010) – Out-Of-Sample Predictions (Based on Models until 2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model Description</th>
<th>Accuracy</th>
<th>Recall</th>
<th>Precision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Women’s Protest, Globalization Model (Model 1)</td>
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<td>.75</td>
<td>.53</td>
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<td>Non-Women’s Protest, Without Globalization Variables (Model 2)</td>
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<td>.77</td>
<td>.53</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Women’s Protest, Globalization Components Model (Model 3)</td>
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<td>.71</td>
<td>.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Protest, Globalization Model (Model 4)</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Protest, Without Globalization Variables (Model 5)</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Protest, Globalization Components Model (Model 6)</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>.19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4: Top 10 Countries Where Protest Intensity is Expected to Increase the Most from 2015-2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Model (1) Non Women’s Protest</th>
<th>Model (2) Non Women’s Protest</th>
<th>Model (3) Non Women’s Protest</th>
<th>Model (4) Women’s Protest</th>
<th>Model (5) Women’s Protest</th>
<th>Model (6) Women’s Protest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Korea South</td>
<td>Korea South</td>
<td>Korea South</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Myanmar (Burma)</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Myanmar (Burma)</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Myanmar (Burma)</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Syria</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Bahrain</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Myanmar (Burma)</td>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>Australia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 2: Map of Risk of Increased Non-Women’s Protest
Figure 3: Map of Risk of Increased Women’s Protest
Figure 4: RMSE and CRPS for Non-Women’s Protest
Figure 5: RMSE and CRPS for Women’s Protest
References


Brandt, Patrick T., John R. Freeman, and Philip A. Schrodt. 2011."Racing horses: constructing and evaluating forecasts in political science." 28th summer meeting of the society for political methodology.


