Help or Harm: The Human Security Effects of International NGOs.
Stanford University Press
Amazon Page for the Book
Do international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) matter? Further, under what conditions are INGOs able to impact policy human rights and development outcomes? According to much of the extant International Relations literature, INGOs are assumed to be purely principled or altruistic actors, existing only to solve the world’s problems. This is a strong assumption, as many in International Relations assume that all actors are self-interested and strategic. This project builds a formal theory which relaxes this assumption, and allows INGOs to have varying preferences, including preferences for rent-seeking from international donations. I investigate how the existence of heterogeneous types of INGOs complicates the interactions of INGOs with both sub-state and international actors and, thus, conditions the likelihood of INGO-induced policy and behavior outcomes.
Solutions to the formal models provide a variety of novel and testable hypotheses relating to both when sub-state and international actors are most likely to support INGOs and when INGOs are most likely to affect policy and behavior outcomes. I conduct a series of statistical tests using new data on the activities and permanent locations of human rights and development INGOs.
The findings of this project highlight both the power and the shortcomings of INGOs, implying that a realistic look at the potential and motivations of INGOs is necessary for improvements in human rights and development. I conclude with policy recommendations for aid foundations, donor governments, and target or host governments, as well as providing policy recommendations for INGOs themselves.
Replication Materials
Amazon Page for the Book
Do international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) matter? Further, under what conditions are INGOs able to impact policy human rights and development outcomes? According to much of the extant International Relations literature, INGOs are assumed to be purely principled or altruistic actors, existing only to solve the world’s problems. This is a strong assumption, as many in International Relations assume that all actors are self-interested and strategic. This project builds a formal theory which relaxes this assumption, and allows INGOs to have varying preferences, including preferences for rent-seeking from international donations. I investigate how the existence of heterogeneous types of INGOs complicates the interactions of INGOs with both sub-state and international actors and, thus, conditions the likelihood of INGO-induced policy and behavior outcomes.
Solutions to the formal models provide a variety of novel and testable hypotheses relating to both when sub-state and international actors are most likely to support INGOs and when INGOs are most likely to affect policy and behavior outcomes. I conduct a series of statistical tests using new data on the activities and permanent locations of human rights and development INGOs.
The findings of this project highlight both the power and the shortcomings of INGOs, implying that a realistic look at the potential and motivations of INGOs is necessary for improvements in human rights and development. I conclude with policy recommendations for aid foundations, donor governments, and target or host governments, as well as providing policy recommendations for INGOs themselves.
Replication Materials